

# *Myth, Reality, and the Future in Southern Africa: Challenges for a New Administration*

The Carter Center

March, 1988

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*When one examines all the foreign policy issues likely to face the next U.S. administration, southern Africa, while inherently difficult, may be the most promising of all in terms of actually influencing positive developments and obtaining measurable results in a short time span. Current policies have begun to capitalize on a tentative movement among nations in the region to address certain situations which are prohibiting stabilization. However, with the existence of an international consensus concerning the illegality of the occupation of Namibia and the dehumanization of the policy of apartheid more could be done to advance a multilateral approach toward southern Africa. In short, a real opportunity to bring peace to a troubled region is being missed. Part of the*

*problem is lack of accurate information and understanding of what is happening in the region. Advocacy and passion have often clouded or distorted reality. This past March, former Governor William Milliken and I were co-chairmen of "Myth, Reality, and the Future in Southern Africa: Challenges for a New Administration," a policy briefing sponsored by The Carter Center of Emory University and the Ford Foundation. During the last two days of March at The Carter Center in Atlanta, we brought together representatives of the presidential candidates, government leaders, and experts on the region to discuss policy options of the United States toward southern Africa.*

*The purpose of the briefing was to examine the many facets of the situation in southern Africa and then to relay what we have learned to those who will comprise the leadership of the next U.S. administration. Rather than critiquing the Reagan administration, we looked toward the design of new policy initiatives in a non-partisan way. Our hope was to separate the myth from the reality in southern Africa and identify options for the United States which would give impetus to southern Africa's efforts to attain a peaceful future.*

*We conducted the briefing in five sessions in which we examined the conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, as well as the interrelationships of those countries. Discussions were focused on: how to get the South Africans and the Cubans out of Angola, what U.S. policy toward Mozambique should be, what can be done to revive Namibian negotiations, and how to encourage movement away from apartheid.*

*We found that all the participants shared a general abhorrence of South Africa's policies, not only of its policy of racial oppression by a minority white government, apartheid, but also of its policies toward the neighboring states which adversely affect the peace and the stability of the whole region.*

*Participants also agreed that in the last few years, progress on resolving these crucial issues has been delayed somewhat both by the Reagan administration and the administration of Mrs. Thatcher. The United States and Great Britain have shown a recalcitrance to join with other nations and, in particular, the United Nations Security Council, to take action to let South Africa know that its continued apartheid policies and its bloody cross-border strikes would not be condoned.*

Jimmy Carter

*Since our briefing in March, we have seen progress made toward the resolution of some of these conflicts in southern Africa. South African troops are being withdrawn from Angola, and negotiations are underway to enable Cuban troops also to leave that embattled country. There has been progress on talks concerning South Africa's occupation of Namibia as well. The United States must continue to support this process. We must continue to work to make a peaceful future for southern Africa a reality and not a myth.*

*Since The Carter Center was founded in 1982, our mission has been to facilitate constructive dialogue among scholars, policy makers, and others on key foreign and domestic issues. The publication and dissemination of these papers presented at the southern Africa policy briefing are intended to further discussion and to encourage a more constructive approach toward the region by the next U.S. administration.*

Jimmy Carter

*This policy briefing came at a critical period in United States and southern African history. The situation remains critical today even though tentative steps toward reconciliation in that region are beginning to be taken.*

*For Americans, it is critical that as we near the end of our presidential selection process and as the country increasingly focuses on the candidates of each*

*political party, their campaigns must have the benefit of the latest thinking on one of the most volatile regions in the world.*

*It is critical for citizens of southern Africa that a state of emergency has been in existence in South Africa for over two years which has suspended the civil rights of a vast majority of the population of that country; that Namibia is still under the thumb of South Africa, clearly in violation of international law; that Angola is embroiled in a military battle with its neighbors; and that Mozambique is almost totally devastated by a guerrilla movement funded and fueled by South Africa. These situations demand an active and concerned policy on the part of the United States, a policy that should not be contingent upon which political party is represented in the executive office of this nation in January. Indeed, I would like to think that the critical conditions in southern Africa require us to transcend party politics. We did just that at The Carter Center briefing as government officials, officials of international organizations, scholars, regional experts, and representatives of the presidential candidates pooled their various resources and formulated a set of U.S. policy options whose common goal is to facilitate the outbreak of peace in the region of southern Africa.*

*Let us hope that this report of the briefing, "Myth, Reality, and the Future in Southern Africa: Challenges for a New Administration," will be read and considered by all who are desirous of positive change in southern Africa, whether they call themselves Democrat or Republican.*

**William Milliken**

## Conference Summary

*John. A. Marcum*

*Professor of Politics*

*Chairperson of International Programs and Activities*

*University of California, Santa Cruz*

Southern Africa is a volatile region afflicted by harsh legacies of colonial and racial domination. By means of a system of imposed racial and ethnic separatism known as *apartheid*, South Africa's white minority (five million) has prolonged its ascendancy over a voteless black majority (28 million). Since 1984, the government has had recourse to repeatedly renewed "states of emergency." South Africa's control over Namibia, despite United Nations action (1966) terminating its League of Nations mandate, and its support of rebel movements in the two largely undeveloped and illiterate former Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique, injected the *apartheid* issue into regional conflict and prompted opportunistic Cuban and Soviet intervention.

Given these circumstances, conference discussion focused on how best to realize several widely endorsed policy goals set forth by President Carter. These goals are to:

- bring an end to the *apartheid* system with the least possible amount of violence;
- obtain the withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces from Angola;
- facilitate an end to Angola's internal conflict;
- realize Namibian independence under UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);
- reduce the negative impact of South African policies on neighboring front-line states; and
- strengthen the independence and internal stability of those states.

South African *apartheid* lies at the core of regional instability. Some policy analysts have perceived the United States choice as limited to either tacit support for the *apartheid* order or acceptance of Communist gains in the region.

However, an apparent Soviet shift away from costly expansionism (viz. Afghanistan) is adding weight to the view that a principled U.S. strategy to promote political freedom and equality in South Africa and the surrounding region constitutes a viable hope for reducing violence and external intervention. Though American strategic interests in the region are not considered vital, over the past four years *apartheid*-related political and moral considerations have led to intensified domestic pressure for a more dynamic American policy. An understanding of the limits and possibilities of American influence in a region of troubled change will be critical to the fashioning of a policy that is maximally effective but does not promise more than it can deliver.

### **South Africa**

More than a decade of repeatedly suppressed yet persistent resistance that began with the Soweto uprising of 1976 has brought a grudgingly reformative South African government to accept that it must find ways to incorporate blacks into economic and political structures of the country. However, the mode, pace, and extent of this incorporation, or cooptation, has remained under the constrictive control of a Nationalist party government unable to persuade credible black leadership to endorse or participate in a process of limited "power sharing." Persisting in policies designed to crush "radical opposition" such as the multiracial African National Congress (ANC) and United Democratic Front (UDF) that demand a universal political franchise, it has come to rely heavily on a policy of buying local black support or quiescence by means of socioeconomic programs of improved housing, education, and social services. The aim is to buy time and use it to persuade appreciable numbers of blacks to accept a modified *apartheid* system. Such a policy is premised on the availability and appropriation of substantial financial resources.

Although the South African economy is grounded in easily transported and relatively boycott-free wealth in gold, diamonds, and strategic minerals, it has

proved vulnerable to external trade sanctions and related loss in financial confidence. Over the past decade, South Africa's population has grown at a faster rate than its economy (a 1.3% versus 3.6% differential according to some estimates). Unemployment within the economically active black population has reached 30 to 40% and is expected to climb to 50 or 60% within 15 years unless there is a fundamental change in the economy. Since the Soweto uprising, South Africa has been a net exporter of capital unable to attract financial and technological investments crucial to economic growth.

Also hampering the infusion of substantial resources into a cooptation strategy has been the militant reaction of Afrikaners fearful of the consequences of the government's haphazard, albeit modest, moves to reduce racial discrimination and compartmentalization. Recent displacement of the liberal Progressive Federal Party by the right wing Conservative Party as the official parliamentary opposition and the emergence of a paramilitary Afrikaner Resistance Movement seeking a return to "pure" Verwoerdian *apartheid* has slowed reform. A xenophobic expression of Afrikaner nationalism, the extreme right threatens to capitalize electorally on government moves to "sell out" to external pressure, notably on Namibia.

By mid-1988 it was evident that the South African government faced deteriorating options. It could not hope to mount and sustain a substantial program of internal development while continuing to expend vast sums administering and defending Namibia (over a billion dollars annually), dispatching expeditionary forces, sustaining surrogate armies (e.g. 32nd Battalion), and mounting "preemptive strikes" against alleged ANC facilities in neighboring states - its strategy of regional destabilization. That South Africa had overstretched the limits of its power was confirmed by its August 1988 military withdrawal from Angola.

## Angola

Decimated by over a quarter century of anti-colonial and internal conflict, Angola is rich in natural resources - oil, diamonds, arable land. Installed in 1975 with the support of Cuban troops and Soviet arms, the government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) failed to reach beyond its traditional urban and northern strongholds to less educated, rural, and religious groups essential to national unity. With South African assistance, rebel forces of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) organized an increasingly successful guerilla war of attrition. This action was met by an increase in Cuban security forces from approximately 20,000 to 35,000. Their presence, in turn, prompted the U.S. government, beginning in 1986, to provide UNITA's "anticommunist" forces with sophisticated weaponry (Stinger anti-air and TOW anti-tank missiles).

In 1985 and again in 1987, the MPLA mounted major tank-led offenses to capture UNITA's "capital" at Jamba in southeastern Angola and to destroy UNITA's communications and supply links to South Africa. The 1977 intervention of South African artillery (G-5 and G-6), air craft, and surrogate forces on behalf of UNITA was so successful that MPLA forces, suffering heavy casualties and losses in Soviet equipment, fell back to Cuito Cuanavale where they were besieged by UNITA and South African forces.

Again, military success led to military escalation. In mid-1988, Cuba sent sizable reinforcements of crack combat troops to Cuito Cuanavale and southward to areas just north of the Namibian border. As South African artillery mired in rainy season mud outside Cuito Cuanavale, Pretoria's forces suffered white as well as black casualties and the loss of several difficult to replace warplanes (including at least two Cheetahs). Angolan Mig23s flying from a new base at Cahama gained

air supremacy over southwestern Angola and even overflowed South African military bases inside Namibia.

This military reversal, and the fortuitous conjuncture of a basic change in Soviet policy, made a resumption of U.S. brokered peace negotiations possible. The Soviet Union's preoccupation with internal reconstruction under reformist Mikhail Gorbachev reduced Moscow's tolerance, let alone enthusiasm, for costly military entanglement in distant southwest Africa. Encouraged by the Soviets, upon whom both were dependent for material and finance, Angola and Cuba agreed to a ceasefire that permitted the orderly withdrawal of South African forces from Angola. Negotiations then centered on a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and South African forces from Namibia, respectively. It left unaddressed the continuing war between UNITA insurgents and the Luanda government.

## **Namibia**

Under South African administration since the end of World War I, Namibia, with its heavily militarized Caprivi Strip reaching into the center of southern Africa, has been viewed as a vital buffer zone by the South African military and as a crucial extension of white political power by Afrikaner nationalists. South African forces repeatedly destroyed guerrilla units of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) attempting to infiltrate from Angola and made half-hearted efforts to build up a "moderate" political alternative to SWAPO inside Namibia. But South Africa's failure to devolve genuine authority on local black leadership insured that an internationally supervised election would result in an electoral victory for SWAPO.

By late 1988, however, the cost-benefit equation in Namibia was changing. If it refused to implement UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), South Africa faced the prospect that the new Cuban presence along Namibia's northern

border would translate into increased support for SWAPO and military encounters with Angolan and Cuban air and ground forces. If it did implement 435, continued control of the crucial rail head and port of Walvis Bay (a legally held enclave) would still leave South Africa in a position to intervene quickly to thwart the eventuality of any threat from Namibian territory while releasing it from the military and economic burdens of direct rule.

An obstacle to such a rational solution remained Nationalist concern for the impact of such a pullback on volatile domestic politics, white and black. While agreement on terms, and actual implementation of a mutual Cuban and South African troop withdrawal remained problematic, a gradual regional retrenchment by an overextended South Africa seemed under way.

### **Mozambique**

Recent South African initiatives - to revive the Nkomati Accord (1984) with pledges to discontinue any residual support for the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents and to provide technical and security assistance to permit the transmission of electrical power from the Cabora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River to South Africa - provide further evidence of at least a short term move away from an aggressive destabilization policy. Originally organized and financed from outside, RENAMO lacks political cohesion and identity but has been brutally effective as a military force that holds sway over large areas of Mozambique's countryside. A successful meeting between President P.W. Botha and Joaquim Chissano at Cabora Bassa in September would seem to have undercut lingering pressure from U.S. conservatives to provide assistance to an "anticommunist" RENAMO that a U.S. Department of State report recently held responsible for vast destruction and the deaths of some 100,000 civilians. Even with the assist of thousands of troops from Zimbabwe and Tanzania, however, the military situation remains desperate. Economic reconstruction in Mozambique and the pace of economic development

in neighboring Zimbabwe are held hostage to continuing RENAMO-fomented violence and chaos. Facing up to grim security and economic realities, Chissano's Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government has moved steadily away from an earlier doctrinaire Marxism and seeks stronger ties with western countries.

## **OPTIONS**

Given the volatile and changing circumstances of southern Africa, the next American administration will face complex issues demanding clear overall strategy and active international collaboration. The engaged and determined leadership of the President will be crucial to the realization of United States policy goals. Recognizing the underlying centrality of racial injustice to the totality of southern African issues, the President will need to address the basic long term goal of bringing an end to *apartheid* in South Africa with minimal violence along with other more immediately achievable regional goals discussed at The Carter Center conference on southern Africa.

### **South Africa**

A retrenched, determined South Africa may be stubbornly resistant to external pressure for fundamental change. For that tormented country this may mean increasing isolation and decay. But chances for positive change may be improved by combining international pressure with educational and other empowerment programs for black South Africans. All future proposals for sanctions should be considered for their potential effectiveness, not for reasons of domestic acceptability. They should be selective, susceptible to rapid implementation and multilaterally imposed. Examples of what might qualify: an international air embargo entailing a strong psychological impact, or bans on the sale of industrial chemicals or high-tech machinery selected for strategic impact and susceptibility to export control. Any punitive measures should be accompanied by clear indications that a reversal of South Africa's race policies

would lead to the abolition of international constraints and resumption of fruitful economic relations.

### **Foreign forces in Angola**

In order to avoid any discontinuity or lost opportunity, the President elect should endorse the current negotiating process concerning Angola and Namibia. Should those negotiations collapse, however, a new administration might turn to the United Nations Security Council, a revised "contact group," or some other multilateral approach that could add weight and provide continuity to the diplomatic quest for peaceful solutions to the inter-linked Angolan and Namibian conflicts. It should caution against a massive Angolan/Cuban assault upon UNITA's Jamba headquarters that might provoke South African re-entry into Angola but also facilitate Cuban withdrawal by pledging to halt assistance to UNITA once that withdrawal began and to resume assistance only if that withdrawal should stop short of completion.

### **Angolan internal conflict**

The United States should press upon the Soviet Union, and the latter upon its client, Cuba, the need to persuade the MPLA government to seek an internal accommodation with regional, ethnic, and religious communities previously excluded from full or equitable political participation. It might make clear to the MPLA that the establishment of normal relations with the United States depends upon such a policy of national inclusion, a policy which would not, however, necessarily entail the incorporation of any particular person (i.e. Jonas Savimbi) as distinct from significant oppositional (UNITA) leadership.

### **Namibian independence**

A principal goal of current negotiations, Namibian independence might be additionally facilitated by pledges of long-term United States and other support

for economic development as well as by U.S. undertakings to help insure the impartiality of United Nations supervised elections.

### **South African impact on neighbors**

The new administration should endorse the current policy of support for the Mozambique government and its moves toward economic liberalization. The United States should also encourage and consider joining the United Kingdom, Italy, and others in providing security-related training and equipment. To help persuade South Africa not to return to aggressive destabilization, the United States should endorse multilateral initiatives to provide support designed to enhance the capacity of security forces in all front-line states and thereby raise the potential cost of cross border strikes from South Africa.

### **Independence and stability of front-line states**

Increased multilateral and coordinated bilateral support for transport and other regional development projects under the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) may serve to strengthen the entire region. Reorientation of trade (e.g. using the Beira and Benguela railways) and communications away from dependency on South Africa constitutes a feasible and important option should South Africa remain ensnared in *apartheid*. Finally, recognizing the limits of its own resources and influence, the new United States administration would do well to seek coordination of its policies with those of its trading partners, political allies, and even seasoned adversaries (Soviet Union), within a framework of overlapping international forums. A successful approach to the issues of *apartheid* and regional development will depend upon the ability of the new administration resolutely to galvanize a broad international consensus behind well-considered strategies and policies.

## **A Regional Overview**

*Andrew Young*

*Mayor of the City of Atlanta*

Understanding the myths and realities of southern Africa and their effect on the future of this important area is an exciting and crucial task which should be a priority for the next administration, Democratic or Republican.

In approaching this subject, it is necessary to keep several points in mind. First of all, recent history reminds us that dramatic political and social change can be accomplished in southern Africa in a very short period of time when the United States takes an active and determined role in evoking such change. An example of this process can be found in Rhodesia, where civil war raged for almost 15 years before four years of concentrated effort by the Carter administration totally reversed that history. My wife recently returned from an independent Zimbabwe and was amazed that former Rhodesian Front leader Ian Smith walks around the capital city of Harare without a bodyguard. After 15 years of bloodshed, there now exists a multi-racial state at peace.

Secondly, effective action which leads to peace in this region requires a role for the government of South Africa. The creation of a free and peaceful state in Zimbabwe would not have been possible without the cooperation of South Africa. If there was a period - and I am reluctant to use the term - when there was actually "constructive engagement" in southern Africa, it was during the Carter administration in the United States and the Callahan Administration in Great Britain when, before we took any action, we arranged consultations with and elicited cooperation from the South Africans. If it had not been for South Africa, I don't think that Ian Smith would have sat at the table to negotiate peace in Zimbabwe. By the same token, if it had not been for the front-line states, especially Mozambique, I don't think that Robert Mugabe would have been able

to lay aside a history of betrayal and distrust and sit confidently at a table with the United States and Great Britain to draft a constitution.

Finally, we must realize that the identity of various groups and factions in southern Africa are often blurred and distorted for political purposes and that we need to clearly understand the backgrounds, perspectives, and initiatives of these groups if we are to deal with each one effectively. For example, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), a group that the Reagan administration defines as the so-called liberation movement in Mozambique, really is not even Mozambican. RENAMO is an organization of those blacks who fought for the Rhodesian Front with Ian Smith and were afraid to stay in an independent Zimbabwe at the end of the war. All of us involved in negotiating a peaceful resolution to the civil war in Zimbabwe - the United States, Great Britain, and the United Nations - must accept some blame for the handling of these individuals. As blacks helping to support a minority white government, they are understandably afraid to stay in an independent Zimbabwe. They asked for passage to Britain and were denied it; they didn't know where to go. The South Africans eventually took them in, trained them, and dropped them back into Mozambique. They have little or no political or ethnic or geographic connection with the Mozambican situation. Similarly, Jonas Savimbi in Angola is not necessarily an African creation, but is, in part, an American creation. Under this administration, we have had a tendency to back the wrong side in most conflicts in southern Africa, sometimes relying on these types of misrepresentation to defend our positions.

I like to approach an understanding of Africa from a missionary perspective, because I think that is where the whole situation began to go awry. When the missionary movement began in Angola, for example, the Baptists had the north, the Methodists had the center, and the Congregationalists - my church - had the southern part of the country. The United States backed the Baptists; although in

this particular case, the Baptists were really working out of Zaire and took most of the money this country gave and let it end up in France by means of Holden Roberto. The Portuguese-educated intellectuals who made up the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) were really backed by the Russians, although I think with feelings of great reluctance. The Angolans had always insisted that they wanted to be a non-aligned African country. Savimbi was sort of a "johnny-come-lately" in the south, and is, no doubt, a very smooth and intelligent man. Interestingly, I left seminary in 1954 and I was planning to go to Angola as a missionary. If I had gone, I would have been in the mission station in which Savimbi's father was the pastor. I would have been teaching in that school. Fortunately, the Portuguese wouldn't let me in, so I came instead to Georgia.

To make a long story short, I think that Kissinger promised Savimbi that he was going to give him some support around the time I was in Congress in the early 1970s. We had just stopped the spending on the war in Vietnam. It was my office that wrote the resolution that first was the Tunney Resolution, and then became the Clark Resolution amendment, which prevented Congress from sending more funds to the CIA and prevented getting us involved in Angola. When that was thwarted, it was our hope that the United States administration under Kissinger would work with the Organization of African Unity toward bringing people together. That seemed to be the actual effort until the last minute when Kissinger promised Savimbi aid. Savimbi pulled out; and the aid, I think to Savimbi's surprise, came from South Africa. It was only then that a massive infusion of Cubans took place - after an invasion by South Africa from the south.

The point I'm making is that all the trouble in southern Africa is South African. It is not Angolan; it is not Mozambican; it is not in opposition to Zimbabwe; it is basically sponsored, financed, directed, armed, trained, and transported from South Africa. What you have in South Africa is a conspiracy on the part of maybe

two million people who are white. I say only two million people because I don't think the majority of white South Africans approve of the strategy that is going on in southern Africa today. The cultural division between Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites, the political divisions, the dominance of the Nationalist party and of the conservative wing of that party, create a kind of political dynamic that makes it virtually impossible for democracy to rule, even among whites. Even the majority of whites do not have an opportunity to make a decision about what is good for whites in South Africa. You really have a population in which a white minority is controlling the white majority; and that white minority, then, is developing the policies that are enslaving and frustrating the growth and development of perhaps as many as two hundred million people. It is not a matter of black and white.

Zimbabwe is a multi-racial country, and people, black and white, who were at war ten years ago are now at peace and are friends with each other.

The security guards that they assigned to me when I was in Zimbabwe last were a black and a white police officer; one who fought with Ian Smith and the other who fought with Robert Mugabe. They were now riding around in the same police car laughing and joking about one another's children. Yet, if they had met ten years ago, one would have had to kill the other. There seems to be no animosity. The business community in Zimbabwe is thriving in a free-market economy in spite of drought, in spite of all the harassment of South Africa, in spite of the fact that there has been little or no infusion of capital and investment from the West - as we promised at the time of independence.

What South Africa has attempted to do is to make the entire southern part of the continent dependent on South Africa. That is not too hard to do, because you have geographic areas that are huge with populations which are very small. Botswana is larger than Texas with about one million people. They can't possibly

patrol those borders. Angola is twice the size of California with about 14 million people, so border patrol there is also difficult. We cannot, with all of our armed forces, patrol our border between Mexico and the United States. We cannot stop drugs from coming in from the Caribbean. We can't even keep immigrants from coming to our shores from Haiti. There is simply no way for African states to protect all of the geography with very small military organizations and very small populations. What you have is a pattern of hit-and-run raids maneuvered by the South Africans that are designed to break the railroad connections.

The old colonial railroad connections passed through the copper and gold mines in the central part of southern Africa to the sea. One went through the Beira Corridor from Zambia and Zimbabwe through Mozambique. Another, the Benguela Railroad, went from Zambia across to Angola. These are railroads that literally cross thousands of miles of barren land. It is no problem at all for a helicopter to fly a few rebels in, blow up a few miles of track, and fly out. It is also no problem for people to come in with helicopter gun ships and machine gun a village and then plant mines along the road, so that for months afterwards people walking or driving are blown up haphazardly. That is the kind of war that is being waged by two million white South Africans against two hundred million people, black and white, in southern Africa. In Botswana, that kind of engagement or aggression is not just against that country's black population. Botswana has a very successful business community that is white, and that coexists and works along with the predominantly black government; it is a very successful multi-racial society. The same is true of almost every one of these southern African countries.

The role, I think, of the next administration is simply to give these two million people a face-saving way out. I put the emphasis on face-saving, because what we demonstrated successfully in the transformation of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe is that it is possible to put together a constitution that grants rights to the majority

while at the same time protecting the rights of the minority. That can be done constitutionally; it can be done with all the diversity of ethnicity and language that exists in southern Africa. The truth of it is the ethnic divisions in southern Africa are no more complicated than the ethnic divisions in Nigeria. For instance, if Nigeria can write a constitution that essentially protects the rights of people in every region, and guarantees them an opportunity to serve in government, an opportunity to be a part of a bureaucracy, a similar kind of constitution, I think, could be constructed for South Africa. What Nigeria has done is take our affirmative action model and make it a national policy.

The only hitch to using a similar process in South Africa is that the only person who could ensure its success is Nelson Mandela. I don't think there is anybody in the black community who has enough moral authority to deliver on agreements that are made. Nobody could undercut an agreement and a constitution in which Nelson Mandela participated in drafting. I think almost any other black leader in South Africa would have a much more difficult time, not only getting agreement for guarantees that might make the white community secure enough to go along, but delivering on those guarantees if they were accepted. The next administration has a very short time to get Nelson Mandela out of jail, to find a way to get South Africa to withdraw from Namibia, and to allow an independent Angola to stop spending all of the oil revenues from Gulf - and now Chevron - to pay the Cubans.

Angola is a very rich country; but it is using most of its wealth, not to help its people prosper and grow, but to keep South Africans out. Once the South Africans withdraw from Namibia, I think there would be no problem getting the Cubans to leave Angola. The Cubans are protecting Chevron. Raids against Chevron have been made by South African troops with a few Angolans interspersed, but South African troops have been captured as far inside Angola

as in what was then the Gulf Oil area, Kabinda. The solution to this situation is not all that difficult.

I have been reluctant to advocate total sanctions against South Africa, mainly because I don't think they can be enforced. Total sanctions actually made Rhodesia's economy stronger. I think there are selective sanctions which can be enforced that will be sufficient to bring about the changes that are necessary. In that kind of geography, an oil embargo, for instance, is virtually impossible. There are some African countries, embarrassingly so, who are even still supplying oil to South Africa because there is no way to stop them. We know that ships that leave African ports end up turning to the south rather than turning to the north with their cargoes of oil. Because of the difficulty of monitoring all maritime traffic in the area, a naval blockade is simply unenforceable.

An airline embargo is enforceable and it would put no pressure on the poor. It would basically make the middle class, upper middle class, and business community share whatever suffering was necessary. It wouldn't destroy the economy and it wouldn't create the kind of import-substitution that works to strengthen the economy. If you close down the airport in Durban and the airport in Johannesburg, then everybody would have to come to Botswana, or catch a train to Zimbabwe, or drive to Maputo in order to fly to Europe and America. It wouldn't take but a few months before that inconvenience, not really suffering, would become an effective air embargo that the United Nations could enforce and that could be monitored by all nations through the international civil aeronautics organization. An air embargo carries particular importance when South African gold and diamonds are transported essentially by air. We have the capacity to monitor all airplanes; we do not have the capacity to monitor all ships. In order to take these steps, it will take a committed United States president. It will take a president with the kind of personal interest that President Carter took to Camp David. The kind of president who allowed myself and Cyrus Vance to

take the initiative in Zimbabwe. I always had the feeling that the full resources of the United States government were on the side of democracy and that it was possible with that power, and with that pressure, to bring about an independent Zimbabwe. I think it will still be possible, with the pressure of the United States, and with the active commitment of the next president, whether Democrat or Republican, to do the same thing. If not, there will be a continuing deterioration of the region that, if it lasts longer than the life of Nelson Mandela, will make it extremely more difficult to bring about total peace in the region, which I think is still possible.

## **A Regional Overview**

***S. T. Ketlogetswe***

*Ambassador of the Republic of Botswana*

*Washington, D.C.*

### **Introduction**

It is fortuitous that this briefing takes place after meetings of two major regional forums: the Southern African Development Coordination Conference annual consultative conference in Arusha on January 28-29, 1988; and the summit of the front-line states in Lusaka on March 24, 1988. I have benefited from their insights and it is my hope that I shall be able to share this with you during the next two days.

To set the tone of my remarks on the political developments in the region, let me quote briefly from the summit communique:

*"The leaders vehemently condemned South Africa's ever-increasing internal repression and brutality in the perpetuation of the apartheid system, its continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its acts of aggression, subversion, destabilization and state*

*terrorism against front-line states, particularly Angola and Mozambique."*

## **General Political Situation**

### **South Africa**

The root cause of the political and security problems besetting the region today is the racist policy of *apartheid* in South Africa. The failure by the Republic of South Africa (RSA) to abolish *apartheid* has led to the current escalation of repression within South Africa itself and the heightening of tension in the region as a whole. Tragically, RSA has found succor and comfort in those who espouse the view that southern Africa is about to be engulfed by a communist onslaught. South African military adventurism into Angola and other neighboring countries and its support for the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), have been justified under the cloak of fighting this communist onslaught. The problems of RSA are self-inflicted; their fountainhead is *apartheid*. By exporting its internal problems to the whole region through its attacks on its neighbors, South Africa has struck on a clever way of internationalizing the issue.

There was hope in 1986 that RSA would accept the Eminent Persons Group's (EPG) "negotiating concept," which would have set in motion a process of dialogue across lines of color, politics, and religion, with a view to establishing a non-racial representative government. RSA's rejection of the EPG mission that it undermined by its unproved attacks on Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe on May 19, 1986, was, in the words of the Vancouver Commonwealth Summit: "nothing less than a tragedy for the region."

For too long South Africa has been able to delude the international community with an unending chain of subterfuges. First, in order to divert attention away from mounting internal problems, RSA has always been able to find an enemy lurking from somewhere outside its borders. Second, to avoid dealing directly with its disenfranchised majority, RSA has always wanted to negotiate with the

wrong groups. South Africa has during the last few years put pressure on its neighbors to enter into a Nkomati type of accord. As everybody knows, the neighboring countries are no threat to RSA. Internally, RSA has imprisoned all the real leaders of the black majority and sought to hold negotiations with those of its own choosing. This of course has the effect of prolonging the stalemate indefinitely.

The United States policy toward South Africa has in part compounded the problems of the region. Firstly, because it has not lived up to its original objective of encouraging RSA to move toward a more just and equitable political accommodation with its black majority. Secondly, it has always been conceived in narrow ideological terms. Thirdly, it has at best been ad hoc and lacked a comprehensive thrust that enabled the other countries to know how to respond to the U.S. policy initiatives. Fourthly, with regard to RSA, it lacked an incentive structure and, as a consequence, its architects and implementors ended up, in the words of Professor Rotberg, "with the carrot but no stick."

The situation in South Africa is not likely to improve unless the United States and the rest of the international community face reality. The problems of southern Africa are not a function of East-West relations. There is no communist onslaught poised to engulf the region. Nor are the exiled nationalist elements hell bent on turning the country into a marxist dictatorship. Those who are so inclined are missing the substance only to embrace the shadow of the actual factors behind our regional tensions.

### **Angola**

The linkage issue and support of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) by South Africa and the United States bedevils the whole South African political and security situation. By supporting UNITA, the U.S. has done in Angola what Rhodesia did in Mozambique. Rhodesia created RENAMO

mainly to punish Mozambique for supporting the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU). The United States is supporting UNITA because the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which it supported, was defeated by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The Cubans would never have come to Angola if South Africa had not invaded Angola in 1975. As we are all aware, Dr. Crocker and the Angolans are talking again; at the same time the U.S. Stinger missiles continue to flow toward UNITA. Our view is that no amount of shuttle diplomacy can serve as an escape from reality. If indeed the U.S. wants the Cubans to leave Angola, it must put pressure on RSA to withdraw its forces first.

### **Mozambique**

In Mozambique, South Africa-sponsored bandit activity has exacerbated the already shaky economic situation. This has led to the disruption of rural life and agricultural production, causing famine. Over five million people, over a third of the population, have been affected by the insurgency and drought. More than 100,000 people have died and an estimated 3.8 million people face starvation. In a move calculated to perpetuate the dependence of the region on itself, RSA has concentrated the brunt of its aggression on the coastal states of Angola and Mozambique. The familiar rationale that RENAMO is fighting an economic onslaught has been used to prolong a phony war of carnage whose cost in human terms has been most severe.

### **Namibia**

The progress to independence under United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 has assumed the status of a permanent stalemate. The illegality of RSA occupation of Namibia has ceased to trouble the conscience of the West. Namibia has been relegated to the back burner; it has become an issue of incidental concern, of nuisance value.

During 1987 there was a flurry of activity. The Council for Namibia met in Angola in May in an attempt to keep the Namibian issue alive. In October, foreign ministers of countries that constitute the membership of the Council for Namibia met in New York and called for action under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter if by 1988 South Africa had still not heeded Resolution 435 (1978). In December, the UN Secretary-General sent a team to Angola to determine whether RSA had withdrawn its troops from Namibia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 602 of 1982.

In November 1985, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the internal parties accepted a proportional representation electoral system, an event that should have triggered the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). However, it was only in October 1987 that the Security Council was able to adopt Resolution 601, theoretically to trigger the implementation of Res. 435 (1978). The reason Resolution 601 (1987) was adopted two years in arrears was because the United States had resisted the convening of the Security Council under the pretext that there were still outstanding issues that remained to be solved. Following the sending of the U.S. government's fact-finding team to Angola, the Security Council passed, in December, Resolution 602 (1987), which gave South Africa two weeks to withdraw its troops from Angola pursuant to Security Council Resolution 602 of 1982.

The general view is that these resolutions will remain a dead letter. Our view is that South Africa has been encouraged by "constructive engagement," and the more the West continues to sweet-talk South Africa, the more violent and defiant she becomes. The linkage issue, which has been unanimously rejected, provides an opening for RSA to renege on its commitment to the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978).

## **SADCC and the Regional Economic Outlook**

The creation of SADCC flowed from the shared experience of the front-line states in fighting for liberation in southern Africa. Launched in 1980, it had two main objectives: to maximize member countries' collective self-reliance and to lessen outside economic dependence, more especially on South Africa. The independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and that of Zimbabwe in 1980, provided the majority-ruled countries in the region with options for regional cooperation that were not possible a decade earlier. Most regrettably, South Africa viewed these developments as a threat to its economic domination of the regional economy.

The 1987 SADCC Annual Progress Report sums the growth prospects of the regional economy in these words:

*"...the current constraints to economic growth in the region are the debt and the balance of payment problems, deteriorating terms of trade, South African aggression and destabilization and the persisting drought."*

A few economic indicators illustrate these constraints. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has calculated that the combined outstanding debt of the nine SADCC countries increased from \$12.95 billion in 1984 to \$14.64 billion at the end of 1985. At this level total debt was equivalent to 50% of the region's GDP. Repayments on long-term debt in 1986 were estimated at \$745 million. Meanwhile, ODA receipts by the region declined by \$77 million from \$1.866 billion in 1984 to \$1.789 billion in 1985.

In 1986-87 the debt-service ratio was estimated by the SADCC Secretariat to range from 2% for Lesotho to 59% for Zambia. Mozambique, for reasons I have already alluded to, had the heaviest debt burden of \$3.2 billion, arrears of \$1.2 billion, and a staggering debt-service ratio of 1,518%. Projections indicate further

deteriorating debt-service ratios unless there is substantial increase in ODA flows.

Average GDP growth for 1986 was estimated at 2.5% and for 1987 at 2.4%. Naturally, these average figures hide disparities in the economic performance of individual member states. Most economies have either stagnated or experienced negative growth rates. Only Botswana and Swaziland recorded appreciable real growth of 12% and 9% respectively.

The existence of the grouping of the majority-ruled states in southern Africa, whether in their political role as the front-line states or in their collective self-reliance venture as SADCC, should be seen as a force for peace and stability in the region. It provides a forum for consultation among member states as well as between SADCC and cooperating partners on issues of mutual interest and concern. Furthermore, since the majority of them cannot give meaningful development on their own, collective self-reliance is the only viable option. Significant progress has been made since 1980 in the implementation of the SADCC Plan of Action as well as in the strengthening of institutional structures at both national and regional levels. Therefore, SADCC makes sense regionally, in the East-West geopolitical terms, or in the North-South dialogue context. It should also be seen as a force for peace and stability now, or in a southern Africa beyond the post apartheid era.

### **Challenges for a New Administration**

The report of the United States Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa had this to say about "The Nature of the Challenge":

*"As a nation with long-term interests in Southern Africa and a fundamental commitment to the promotion of justice and democratic values, the United States cannot stand aside as a human tragedy of potentially immense proportions threatens to*

*unfold in South Africa. At risk are the lives of thousands, possibly millions, of South Africans, black and white, the future political and economic viability of the entire southern third of the African continent, and history's judgment of the United States."*

In the light of the challenge, what steps should the next U.S. administration take?

The following, though not exhaustive, provide a basis for a response to the challenge.

- De-link the independence of Namibia from the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This linkage is an extraneous issue to which the people of Namibia should not be held hostage.
- Stop aid to UNITA and give South Africa notice that any future military collaboration with this organization would be viewed in a serious light.
- The United States and her allies should get their act together and put pressure on South Africa to desist from destabilizing the region. It is indeed the height of folly that scarce resources should continue to be poured into SADCC assets while at the same time South Africa is allowed to blow them up.
- Economic, political, and security aspects of the region are intertwined, and therefore any policy framework should address both issues.
- The United States, as a self-appointed moral leader of the world, must be seen to act in accordance with its own precepts.

The glaring disparity between the United States policy in Latin America and elsewhere vis à vis that toward southern Africa has damaged U.S. standing in the region. It can no longer be seen as an honest broker because of its perceived partiality toward South Africa.

Finally, any policy toward southern Africa must have an input from the countries in the region. This was the case in the resolution of the Rhodesian problem when the frontline states played such a pivotal role in the negotiations. An insurance to the United States' interests in the region cannot be underwritten by Stinger missiles, but by a southern Africa at peace.

## The Potential U.S. Role in Bringing About Political Change in South Africa

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Events in South Africa in the last two months once again have drawn the world's attention to the seemingly intractable social and political crises in that country. Pretoria's decision to ban 17 anti-*apartheid* groups and 18 prominent black anti-*apartheid* activists seems to cry out for a response from the West that will bring the South African government to its senses and to the political bargaining table. Thus, the ongoing debate over what the United States and other western powers should do to eliminate *apartheid* receives fresh impetus, and arguments over the types, quantities, and timing of sanctions are once again the order of the day. The debate is an important one and it would indeed be disappointing if the West simply chose to ignore the institutionalized injustices of South Africa. But too often it has been reduced to a simple question of whether or not one supports a specific policy - "Do you support disinvestment? Are you in favor of trade sanctions?" Frequently the debate then moves on to whether the policy option selected can be effectively carried out and what the economic impact on South Africa is likely to be.

These are fine questions - and they should be asked and answered at some point in the public policy debate - but before they are tackled several preliminary questions should be conscientiously examined. The first question concerns what it is we hope to see replace *apartheid*. Too often our vision of a future South Africa stops with what we do not want - *apartheid* - and fails to clearly delineate what we want to see take *apartheid's* place.

The second question asks how political change is likely to come to South Africa given the realities of that country. If one concludes that political change is only likely to come through revolutionary violence, this would lead one to select a set of policy options quite different from those based on a conclusion that political change in South Africa is most likely to be achieved through negotiation and compromise.

The third question concerns the present economic and political realities of South Africa.

### **United States Objectives in South Africa**

As mentioned above, U.S. objectives can be both reactive - South African legislation and policies we wish to see repealed - and proactive - developments the United States would seek to encourage in South Africa.

Among the reactive objectives would be:

- Ending the state of emergency and releasing detainees.
- Releasing political prisoners and unbanning the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).
- Lifting the banning orders on other individuals and organizations inside South Africa.
- Eliminating all remaining forms of petty *apartheid*; e.g. segregation of public facilities, restrictions on black businesses trading in the central cities.
- Ending residential and educational segregation.
- Stopping the creation of any additional independent homelands and reincorporating the existing four independent homelands into South Africa.
- Ending the system of racial classification by the state with the repeal of the Population Registration Act.

There is a high degree of consensus over these reactive objectives both within the United States and the 85% of the South African population that is black.

Consensus begins to break down when one begins to consider proactive objectives. These objectives fall into two roughly antithetical clusters. The first embodies liberal democratic and capitalist economic values. The second

emphasizes central government guidance and control of political and economic activities within the country.

Included among the liberal democratic and capitalist objectives would be:

- Legal safeguards for individual rights.
- An independent judiciary.
- An acceptance of multiparty democracy and political pluralism.
- Transitional political structures that could offer some protection to minority groups from oppression by the majority.
- An economic system that provides for individual property ownership and rewards individual initiative. It could also have redistributive features such as increased spending on social welfare and the purchase of white-owned farms by the state and their division among black rural residents.

The second cluster of objectives would include:

- The need for a strong central government whose interests at times would take precedence over political pluralism and individual rights.
- Straightforward majority rule with no political structures guaranteeing minority groups political power in excess of their numerical weight in the voting population.
- State ownership of the mining companies, banks, major manufacturing firms, transportation networks, and utilities.
- Significant land redistribution and rapid redistribution of income.

While nearly all Americans and white South Africans would support the liberal democratic set of objectives over the second set, there is substantial support among black South Africans for the latter.

These differences of vision over the outline of a post-*apartheid* South Africa obviously complicate American relations with black South Africans.

A final set of possible United States policy objectives are related to the level and types of violence now extant in South Africa. Simply saying that the United States opposes all violence in South Africa or that we wish for change to come with the least amount of violence possible avoids examining the possibility that some

forms of violence may be more susceptible to U.S. policy initiatives than others. Currently, South Africa is the scene of:

- State violence directed against its domestic opponents through police actions, detentions, torture during detention, and capital punishment.
- State violence against its opponents living in the front-line states.
- Vigilante violence by both blacks and whites against state opponents.
- Violence between rival black political groupings. ANC bombings of hard targets such as government buildings, power lines, and military offices.
- ANC bombings of civilian targets.
- Attacks on black police, government officials, and suspected informers in the townships.

The issue for policy makers is whether the reduction of any of these forms of violence should be considered a policy objective and, if so, whether the reduction of some forms of violence is considered more critical than other forms of violence.

### **The Likely Process of Change**

Talk of violence leads to the question of how *apartheid* is likely to be dismantled - swept away by revolutionary violence or negotiated away during a period of ongoing but relatively low-level violence. If the former is seen as either the inevitable or the preferred route for South Africa to take, then U.S. policies that increase the military capabilities of the ANC undermine the ability of the South African government to defend itself might be appropriate. However, most observers see South Africa as an inhospitable setting for a successful revolution. Much more likely is a pattern of chronic violent challenges to the state characterized by periods, such as just occurred, of widespread violence, consumer boycotts, and strikes. In this likely scenario, both sides can inflict costs on the other but neither can prevail. For Western policy makers, their choice is either to back one side or the other in the period leading up to the hoped for political negotiations or to take on the unenviable task of attempting to exert influence on both sides.

## South African Realities

Any U.S. policy toward South Africa, whether it be punitive sanctions or programs of positive support for development in line with our objectives, or some combination of the two, stands a greater chance of success if it takes into account the economic and political realities of that country. Although I realize that one person's "reality" may be another's "myth," I believe the following characteristics of South Africa are supported by enough evidence to qualify as realities that will affect the impact of U.S. policies toward that country.

### Economic realities

- *The South African economy is quite often open to world trade.* During the 1980s, foreign trade as a proportion of gross domestic product has averaged about 50%. The country's major commodity imports are machinery (about 25% of total commodity imports), chemicals (11%), and vehicles (also 11%). Oil and arms are not broken out in the trade statistics for security reasons.

South Africa's major exports are gold (about 40% of total commodity exports), minerals and metals (23%), and agricultural products (6%).

- *Net capital flows to South Africa have been low for the past decade and in recent years more capital has left the country than has come in.* After decades of being a net importer of capital, South Africa since the Soweto riots of 1976-77 has become a net exporter. The outflow is accounted for by dividends repatriated by foreign-owned subsidiaries and by the repayment of foreign debts.
- *South Africa suspended the repayment of its foreign debt when threatened by a massive outflow of foreign loan capital.* Spurred by a negative reassessment of South Africa's credit risk, several United States banks decided in July/August of 1985 to freeze unused credit lines to South Africa borrowers and not renew short term loans. Faced with the possibility of having to repay up to \$14 billion in short term debt, the South African government declared a moratorium on the repayment of that debt. At the same time, Pretoria reintroduced a two tier exchange rate for the *rand* that shielded the economy from the impact of foreign capital outflows.

Since declaring the debt moratorium, South Africa has successfully negotiated a repayment schedule that will see 18 percent of the \$14 billion in foreign loans repaid by mid-1990.

- *The unemployment rate among black South Africans is already high and will go still higher.* Although accurate figures are not available, various estimates show unemployment among blacks to be on the order of 30-40% and for whites between 5 and 8%. Researchers note that nearly 4 million blacks will enter the labor force between now and the year 2000 and there is no sign that anywhere near that number of jobs will be created. As a result, it is frequently estimated that 50% of the black economically-active population will be unemployed 15 years from now barring some dramatic change in the economy.

### Political realities

- *Many aspects of apartheid have been eliminated since 1977. This is especially true in terms of economic constraints on blacks, much less true in terms of social constraints and not true at all when it comes to political power.* The South Africa of 1988 is not the same country of a decade ago. Statutory restrictions on blacks holding or being trained for certain jobs have been lifted, trade unions for blacks have been legally recognized, and black-owned businesses are beginning to be allowed to trade in the central business districts previously zoned for white businesses only.

Socially, the influx control laws restricting the movement of blacks within the country were repealed in 1986, prosecutions of blacks living in "white" areas of Johannesburg were halted, and in recent years many recreational facilities and some public transportation systems were desegregated. Less significant from a practical standpoint was the repeal of laws making marriage and sex across the color line a criminal offense. At the same time, Pretoria has repeated its commitment to segregated education and to making only modest changes in the Group Areas Act compelling residential segregation.

Politically, little has changed to give black South Africans a voice in decisions affecting their lives. The tri-cameral parliament launched in 1984 with its separate houses for whites, coloreds, and Indians gives the white ruling party the power to pass legislation in the face of deadlock between

the three houses. It also excludes blacks from national politics. The government has proposed a National Council comprised of a majority of appointed whites and blacks and a minority of elected black representatives to advise it on further constitutional reforms.

- *The partial dismantling of apartheid has caused increasing dissatisfaction and political dissent on the part of right-wing whites.* In 1982, 22 National Party members of Parliament broke with the party over its proposed tri-cameral parliament and formed the Conservative Party. Its platform is to reverse the reforms in *apartheid* implemented since 1977 and return to full-blown *apartheid*. In the first national election it contested, the Conservative Party won 26% of the white vote, gained 22 seats in the 166 seat white house of parliament, and became the official opposition party. The National Party saw its support fall from 58% of the white vote in the last election held in 1981 to 52% in 1987. Even though it lost 8 parliamentary seats, it still holds 123 of the 166 seats.

Although analysts differ over the Conservative Party's potential for growth, they are agreed that the Conservative Party's electoral successes have made the National Party more cautious in its consideration of further reforms and more vigorous in its repression of dissent from the left.

- *Black South Africans have shown an increasing ability and willingness to resist the government's apartheid policies.* Black South Africans have used work "stay aways," consumer boycotts, rent strikes, illegal squatting, and attacks on security forces in recent years in defiance of the *apartheid* system. At the height of the 1984-86 period of resistance, various townships for various lengths of time became "no-go" areas for government officials except when accompanied by security forces. Consumer boycotts and work "stay-aways," by directly affecting the bottom line of white business, motivated that segment of the white community to urge Pretoria to end detentions without trial, the state of emergency, and the stationing of troops in the black townships.

At the same time these actions were challenging *apartheid*, black organizations began to develop alternative local political structures in the townships through street and neighborhood committees. These committees kept residents informed of strike and boycott actions, engaged in political education, and performed a quasijudicial function in handling disputes among residents.

- *The South African government has managed to severely disrupt groups opposed to its rule and is actively seeking to implement its own political structure for black South Africans.* Pretoria has reacted forcefully and effectively to quell black resistance to its continued rule. Using sweeping powers granted under states of emergency, the security forces detained some 30,000 people during 1985-87 for varying periods and have kept more than 1,500 locked up since the second state of emergency was declared in June 1986. In February 1988, the government effectively banned 17 of the most active black opposition groups and banned 18 activists from political activities. Organizations not affected by the banning orders were put on warning a week later when the government introduced a bill in parliament that would give it the power to confiscate foreign funds donated to South African groups that used them for political purposes.

The emergency regulations also severely restrict press freedom and the ability of both the domestic and international communities from learning about anti-*apartheid* opposition in South Africa. The government has prohibited any news coverage of protest incidents or security force actions and correspondents are required to leave the scene of any potential political disturbance.

In addition to this open means of repressing dissent, there is ample evidence that detainees have been tortured while in the hands of the security police. Several opponents of the government also have been murdered under circumstances that strongly suggest involvement by state security forces.

As a result of these actions, all of the major anti-*apartheid* groups in South Africa have been severely disrupted and their activities either stopped or driven into a sporadic underground existence. The level of anti-state violence in the black townships has dropped off significantly, according to black activists, and Pretoria now has the upper hand in terms of control.

The South African government hopes to consolidate these gains by reviving locally elected black township councils that were the first targets of black resistance activities in 1984-85. Townships that support local councils will be rewarded with infrastructure improvements. Elected

township councilors would then participate in selecting representatives to the previously discussed national council.

- *The South African business community is not a potent lobbying force for political change.* Although progressive elements of the business community mounted a successful effort to liberalize restrictions on black labor, they have neither the will nor the ability to achieve a lifting of *apartheid's* restrictions on the political rights of blacks. The business community is strongly opposed to the anti-capitalist positions taken by many government opponents and is quite frankly pessimistic over what life for whites would be like under a black majority government.

Even if they had the will, the ruling National Party has made it clear that it will not tolerate businessmen "meddling" in politics. Its sharp attack on Chris Ball, the head of First National Bank, when he approved a loan to an Indian businessman that was used to pay for a legal advertisement calling for negotiations with the ANC was a warning that few have failed to heed. The government's willingness to listen to business recommendations on repealing economic aspects of *apartheid* came about when Pretoria was convinced that economic growth required the dismantling of economic *apartheid*. When it comes to dismantling political *apartheid*, Pretoria is convinced of just the opposite logic - namely, that the economy will suffer if whites do not maintain political control.

For these reasons, reform has not figured prominently on the business agenda in the nearly two years since the second state of emergency was declared. Instead, the attention of the business community is now focused on taking advantage of the recent economic upturn, finding ways to evade sanctions, and curbing the growing power of black trade unions.

### **Guidelines for a U.S. Policy Toward South Africa**

These South African realities suggest several rules of thumb that could guide the formulation of United States policies aimed at achieving the twin goals of dismantling *apartheid* and creating in its place a nonracial democracy with a market-oriented economic structure.

- *The South African government has the capacity, will, and wit to reduce the impact of punitive economic sanctions.* South Africa's exports of gold, diamonds, and platinum account for nearly 60% of her export earnings and are effectively immune from trade sanctions unless the West blockades all sea, land, and air traffic leaving South Africa. With the earnings from these exports, South Africa would then be able to purchase, albeit at inflated black market prices, essential machinery, and chemical imports it required to keep its economy going.

Because South Africa has no domestic petroleum reserves, an oil embargo often is seen as the best way to put pressure on Pretoria. The South African government also is aware of its vulnerability and during the past decade has commissioned two oil-from-coal facilities that now provide about 40% of the country's oil needs. During the recent period of lower world oil prices, South Africa also increased its oil stockpiles which are now estimated to contain from 15 months to three years supply at current levels of consumption. In the event of a mandatory oil embargo, South Africa probably would cut back on the amount of oil it supplies the heavily dependent front-line states and would introduce a domestic rationing system.

The additional costs associated with a worldwide embargo of machinery, chemical, and oil exports to South Africa would of course have a negative effect on the country's economic growth rate which would lead to increasing unemployment, particularly among blacks. But at least a portion of these unemployment costs could be exported if South Africa chose to repatriate the nearly one million immigrant workers from the frontline states. Given Pretoria's willingness to take drastic actions when under threat - for example, its decision to suspend its foreign debt repayments - repatriation of migrant labor is a real possibility.

- *Punitive economic sanctions need to be multilateral and implemented quickly to maximize their effectiveness.* It does little good if only one or two of South Africa's trading partners imposes economic sanctions. In the absence of a multilateral sanctions policy, other countries would be able to supply the boycotted product. And, if sanctions are threatened over a long period of time

before being implemented, as they were in the case of arms and oil, this gives South Africa the time it needs to develop an effective response.

- *Strategies that worked in the past to get the economic and some of the social aspects of apartheid repealed, are not likely to succeed in getting Pretoria to negotiate away political apartheid.* The threat of economic harm caused by strikes of black workers and proposed international economic sanctions in the late 1970s encouraged the South African business community to push for the repeal of discriminatory laws affecting black labor. In large part because the repeal of these aspects of *apartheid* did not explicitly undermine continued white political control, lobbying efforts by business were successful.

In order to convince white South Africans that it is in their long-term interest to hand over political power at the negotiating table, it may be necessary for the West to guarantee significant amounts of economic and development assistance to a post-*apartheid* South Africa. At present, most white South Africans believe they have two choices. The first is continuing a policy of modest reforms coupled with state repression of dissent with a backdrop of increasing international economic sanctions. They recognize this will lower their standard of living and quality of life but it is preferable to the second scenario. The second choice, in their minds, is a black-run government that through nationalization of industry and rapid income redistribution devastates the economy. In this scenario, they are even worse off. By offering a "Marshall Plan" for South and southern Africa, the West would be creating a third option that would give it some leverage over the South African government and its opponents.

- *Policies should be structured so that interim steps taken by both the South African government and its opponents toward negotiating the end of political apartheid are rewarded and that actions blocking its dismantling are punished.* Every action taken by Pretoria and its anti-*apartheid* opponents cannot be rewarded or punished since the United States would soon run out of policy measures. But, actions taken by either party to ease the way to the negotiating table - Pretoria's repeal of the Group Areas Act and Population Registration Act, for example, and the ANC suspending its attacks within South Africa - could be rewarded by easing some of the existing economic sanctions, expanding diplomatic relations, and providing increased humanitarian aid.

Because of the extreme sensitivity of both the South African government and its black opponents to being seen as a "puppet" of the West, the quid pro quo features of our policies would have to be downplayed.

## **Reviving Namibian Negotiations**

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### **Introduction**

It is remarkable how developments in southern Africa in recent months have placed the question of Namibia on the back burner. Obviously, the issue has not been neglected, but the urgency and high priority given to it in the period 1978-1980 is no longer evident. Following the submission of the *Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation* by the Western Five or Contact Group and the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 435 (1978), there were euphoric expectations that Namibia would attain its independence before Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. The latter has long since obtained its independence while the clouds still remain dark over the emergence of Namibia to independent statehood.

The United Nations Council for Namibia, the African states of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) are using their best efforts to keep alive the struggle for Namibian independence. However, the measures they have sponsored or proposed, as well as the actions they have taken, have not yet removed successfully the outstanding obstacles to full implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). Instead of brightening the prospect for an early agreement on the independence of Namibia, other developments and positions, such as the linkage

issue, have brought about an impasse in the efforts to bring to fruition the negotiations over Namibian independence.

Time and time again, the international has witnessed widespread speculation that we are on the verge of a final and successful agreement on Namibia, only to have such hopes quickly dashed and to await the next round of optimistic speculations. Why has the Namibian situation become so seemingly intractable? The predominant view is that South Africa has not yet reached a firm decision to grant independence to Namibia in the context of internationally approved arrangements. However, there are those who would argue that, for South Africa, the strategic, political, and psychological factors are real and that, therefore, the presence of large numbers of Cuban troops in Angola should not be ignored. In any event, the deliberations regarding Namibian independence have become murkier and the prospect for an agreement has receded.

### **Broad Consensus on Namibia**

This outcome is surprising in view of the broad consensus that exists in the international community about Namibia. First and foremost there is agreement, both in law and in fact, that the administration of South Africa in Namibia is illegal. It is widely accepted that there should be a transfer of power to the people of Namibia by means of free and fair elections under international supervision. Implicit in the adoption of Resolution 435 (1978) is the recognition that it would be preferable to realize independence for Namibia through negotiation. There is also agreement that all outstanding issues related to the implementation of Res. 435 (1978) have been this development was the linkage issue introduced.

### **Implications of Failure to Implement Resolution 435 (1978)**

It is necessary to face squarely the serious implications of the failure of the international community to end the illegal regime in Namibia. Attention should be focused on the fact that the illegal administration in Namibia is in a different

category from the issue of the "illegal regime" in the Republic of South Africa. While there might be some who would argue that the denial of majority rule in South Africa does not necessarily constitute an illegal regime, there is little or no room to argue that South Africa's administration in Namibia is anything but illegal. The ruling of the International Court of Justice and numerous resolutions of the United Nations have firmly established this point.

It is, of course, proper to wonder about the legal implication of the negotiations with South Africa regarding the Proposal for a Settlement on the Namibian Situation. Does South Africa now have some legal standing in Namibia until such time as Resolution 435 (1978) can be fully implemented? As is well-known, South Africa has never accepted that its rule in Namibia is illegal. In fact, it continues to act as if it were the legitimate constitutional authority on the territory. It is of some interest to observe, however, that the United Nations has frequently impressed upon South Africa that it would aggravate its illegal rule in Namibia if it should abandon the settlement proposal of 1978 by turning over the government of Namibia to the "internal parties." In this connection, the General Assembly strongly condemned South Africa for the imposition of the so-called interim government in Namibia on June 17, 1985.

In the jurisprudence of the United Nations, the legal position is clear. Despite the negotiations with South Africa on the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978), the administration of South Africa in Namibia is still illegal. The negotiations with South Africa have their rationale inasmuch as they seek to bring a situation of illegality to an end. The United Nations Council for Namibia remains the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until such time as the people of the territory can assume full responsibility for their own well-being. The practical consideration of how the Council would exercise its responsibility inside Namibia was what warranted the negotiations between the Western Five and South Africa which led to the "Proposals".

In further assessing the implications of the failure to implement Resolution 435 (1978), it should be recalled that the Western Five undertook the responsibility of negotiating with South Africa with a view to demonstrating to the African states that there exists "better means" of securing the independence of Namibia than through "armed struggle" and the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions. It should not be forgotten, however, that the African states themselves, on the basis of the *Lusaka Manifesto*, had established a framework for negotiations with South Africa. Interestingly enough, President Kaunda of Zambia promoted the Manifesto as a legal basis for holding negotiations with South Africa in 1969 on all southern African problems. The Manifesto itself was adopted at the fifth summit conference of East and Central African States in Lusaka in April 1969 and later endorsed by the OAU and the United Nations General Assembly. However, with respect to the question of Namibia, the logical position of the African states prior to the adoption of Resolution 435 (1978) was as follows: since it could not be denied that South Africa was illegally in Namibia, the Security Council should not hesitate to impose effective sanctions against South Africa in accordance with its Charter. When Resolution 435 (1978) was approved it appeared to suggest that South Africa could be persuaded to end its illegal administration by peaceful means.

It is not being suggested here that the African states readily believed that South Africa was sincere in accepting either the "Proposal" or Resolution 435 (1978). In fact, many African states deeply doubted the motive of South Africa throughout the negotiations on the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). What should be borne in mind is that despite their skepticism, the front-line states, in particular, gave their full support to the Western Five's efforts to implement Res. 435 (1978). The front-line states were able to convince or "deliver" SWAPO at many stages of the negotiations. It has, therefore, been very disappointing to the front-line states, in particular, that no significant pressure was exercised to obtain South Africa's full compliance with Res. 435 (1978).

Any exercise to determine new policy options for Namibia ought to see clearly some other implications of the failure to implement Resolution 435 (1978). In the search for accommodation in southern Africa, the African states and the liberation movements have been urged to place greater reliance on negotiations rather than on "armed struggle." As was noted previously, in spite of the African states' embrace of negotiations, Namibia still remains under illegal administration. For SWAPO the lesson is a bitter one. It may therefore be justified in arguing that only a concentration on "armed struggle" could bring about the independence of Namibia. African States in Lusaka in April 196

One would have thought that those states that continue to reject "armed struggle" as the means to end the illegal regime in Namibia would have spared no efforts to ensure complete success of the negotiating track. Had this been the case, then it could have been held up to the black people of South Africa as the preferred means to end the system of *apartheid* in their country. On the contrary, the failure of the negotiation process to secure independence for Namibia may partly account for the reluctance, or refusal, of the African National Congress to engage South Africa in negotiations, seriously assuming that South Africa were to show any inclination to negotiate. For a policy option to be sound, it should hold a reasonable prospect of success. Consequently, the failure to push the negotiating process on the Namibian situation to its final conclusion is bad news for those arguing in favor of peaceful negotiations to end *apartheid* in South Africa.

A similar argument could be made about the wisdom of imposing comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa with respect to efforts to end *apartheid*. As was observed earlier, the African states in the Security Council had agreed to put off a call for sanctions in order to give the Western Five sufficient time to determine whether they could achieve the goal of Namibian independence without sanctions. Now, almost a decade after opting for this position, they can discern that the result has been disappointing. Can anyone be

surprised that the African states now insist that only comprehensive mandatory sanctions can bring about meaningful change, if anything can, in South Africa's position?

During the period of high optimism about prospects for Namibian independence, there was a feeling that South African policy makers were fully conscious of the demonstration effect of a solution in Namibia. There was the suggestion that South Africa indeed wished a negotiated solution in Namibia to prove that the negotiating process is a preferred option for southern Africa. An internationally acceptable solution in Namibia was supposed to relax the pressure on South Africa regarding *apartheid*, thereby providing a breathing space for a negotiating option to make arrangements for a pluralistic society in South Africa.

Did South Africa, in terms of this analysis, turn away from this prospect because it discerned a lack of will, on the part of the international community, to push through the settlement in Namibia? Those who believed that South Africa was serious when it accepted the Western Five's proposals would say that South Africa had a change of heart when at least two developments occurred. One was the victory of President Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the other was the emergence of a new administration in the United States. Whatever the truth of these assumptions, the fact is that South Africa remains comfortably in Namibia and is showing every indication that it intends to stay there for a long time.

### **Remove the Linkage Issue**

A position being put forward in this paper is that any policy review must, of necessity, examine the above implications of the failure to stay the course in the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). Such a review may warrant a renewed determination to fully implement the resolution, which still commands the broadest basis for an internationally acceptable settlement on Namibia. Needless to say, it would be absolutely necessary to de-link the solution of the Angola

problem from the independence of Namibia. Whatever justification there may have been in introducing the linkage issue in the Namibian negotiation, it has been clearly demonstrated that it complicated the matter of Namibian independence and created doubts in the minds of the Africans as to the true motive of those who brought about linkage. Appropriate arrangements could be made to tackle the problem of Cuban troops in Angola independently from that of full implementation of Resolution 435 (1978).

It should be clear from the foregoing that no attempt is being made to rule out negotiation between the government of Angola and other parties on the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Angolan government itself, by tabling its *Platform* of September 1984, indicated its willingness to negotiate on this matter. What has been rejected by the African states and the rest of the international community is the linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops with the full implementation of Res. 435 (1978). Perhaps, when the linkage issue was injected into the Namibian negotiations, it was thought that it might pressure Angola into deciding on the withdrawal of Cuban troops unconditionally. This, of course, has not happened. On the contrary, it may well be that the card of diplomatic recognition and exchange may be a better card to play.

Owing to reported understandings reached with contacts in negotiations involving Angola, the United States, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and South Africa on Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola, it may not be an easy matter to delink Angola from Namibia, but the effort must be made. It is neither a wise policy nor in the interest of the Namibian people to delay Namibia's independence until the far more complicated Angolan situation is resolved satisfactorily. Here, one should take account of the widespread suspicion that South Africa has seized upon the linkage issue as a pretext to avoid full implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). Those sharing this suspicion have suggested that even if the matter of removing Cuban troops from Angola is resolved, South Africa will play its UNITA (National

Union for the Total Independence of Angola) card to further complicate matters. Rather than play into South Africa's hand, the international community should stress more the illegal nature of South African administration in Namibia and devise policy options to deal with it. Most recently, the Security Council, in its resolution 601 of October 1987, reaffirmed the illegal nature of South African administration in Namibia.

### **New Directions in Namibia**

A new policy in Namibia, apart from removing the linkage, may demand redoubled efforts to implement Resolution 435 (1978). With a view to tackling the delaying tactics of South Africa, a specific deadline should be established for the introduction of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. If South Africa fails to meet this deadline, the Security Council should initially adopt two limited measures: (1) selective economic sanctions particularly related to Namibia and (2) international assistance to SWAPO. It is acknowledged that the African states would prefer comprehensive mandatory sanctions. But we are also conscious of the refusal of key members of the Security Council to go along with such measures under present circumstances. Perhaps, in this instance, a show of international solidarity and determination may be more important.

Considerable efforts should be made to target principally economic assets closely linked with the territory of Namibia. Even though the government of South Africa might attempt to conceal it, there should be a total ban of all imports from Namibia. It would also be necessary for all the members of the United Nations to restrict to the barest minimum all contacts with the territory. In this regard a travel ban to the territory for purposes of tourism should be considered.

In the present circumstances, SWAPO receives some modest international support. The United Nations, relying on its acceptance of SWAPO as the sole

legitimate representative of the Namibian people, defrays expenses of the SWAPO office in New York as well as covers the travel expenses of SWAPO representatives invited to the United Nations in New York or outside of United Nations headquarters. Such meetings would deal with matters of interest to the liberation struggle of the Namibian people. The estimated cost for such purposes during 1988 amounts to \$572,800.

It is pertinent to observe that for the United States government, this United Nations support has presented it with some difficulties. In accordance with Section 527 of Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programmes Appropriation Act, 1988, the U.S. government is barred from making any payments to the United Nations for SWAPO and other organizations or states listed in the act. Accordingly, the United States has consistently informed the United Nations that it would withhold proportionally any payments for SWAPO. The matter of international support for armed struggle may also be problematical. The issue could even become highly controversial if the assistance should include lethal support. There are a number of member states that hold the strong view that the United Nations, by its Charter, should not be in the business of supporting armed struggle. But account must be taken of the unique circumstance of Namibia, particularly by very broad consensus that South Africa's administration in Namibia is illegal. It is also a fact that the refusal to support "armed struggle" is not absolute. Even those who, in the Security Council, opposed armed struggle in the case of SWAPO, ANC, PAC or PLO find no difficulty in supporting armed struggle of their own choosing. But, apart from the matter of lethal support to SWAPO, a more robust international support for SWAPO may have a significant impact on South Africa's attitude.

The measures suggested above may not be sufficient to produce the desired results. Should this turn out to be the case, then the international community should be obliged to consider seriously more measures to enforce its will so as to

bring about a change in South Africa's policy in Namibia. To further demonstrate their determination for Namibia's independence, governments should decide to reduce whatever diplomatic representation they have in South Africa until such time that South Africa cooperates in the full implementation of the United Nations Plan.

### **No Need to Reopen Negotiations on UN Implementation Plan**

Because of the broad international consensus on what is required to bring Namibia to independence, there appears to be no valid reason to reopen negotiations on the content of the United Nations Implementation Plan. Perhaps, with the passage of time, there might be a tendency to forget or ignore the agreements already reached in negotiations. Following the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa in August 1983, "...all legitimate problems" standing in the way of the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) were removed (S/18767). In his report to the Security Council in May 1987, the Secretary-General stated that the parties had agreed that "all outstanding issues relevant to the United Nations plan had been resolved." In the same report, he confirmed that agreement had been reached on the system of proportional representation for elections envisaged in Res. 435 (1978). How the system of proportional representation would work in practice would be elaborated by the Secretary-General's special representative and the South African Administrator-General, once the implementation of the UN Plan had commenced (S/18767 of March 31, 1987). The Security Council, by its Resolution 601 of October 30, 1987, authorized the Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a ceasefire between South Africa and SWAPO in order to undertake administrative and other practical steps necessary for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia. Technical arrangements relating to a cease-fire were negotiated in 1979-1980 with the government of South Africa, as well as representatives of SWAPO, and the front-line states. As a result of these talks, agreement was reached on the modalities for a cease-fire once all outstanding issues had been resolved. The only requirement remaining is

agreement on a date for the commencement of the cease-fire. There exists an understanding as to how the exchange of letters on a cease-fire could be made in view of South Africa's reluctance to sign a cease-fire agreement with SWAPO. Agreement and understandings have also been reached on other aspects of the Namibian problem. There is no longer any difficulty with the size and composition of the military component of UNTAG. As of July 1982 agreement was reached with the South African authorities in respect to almost all provisions of the UNTAG Status Agreement - an agreement to ensure the diplomatic status of UN personnel in Namibia. With a view to coming to terms with South Africa's concerns about the impartiality of the United Nations, the Chairman of the Namibia pre-implementation meeting (former Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart) that met in Geneva in January 1981 noted that both South Africa and the UN would have to make certain undertakings to ensure the impartial discharge of their respective responsibilities.

### **What About a SWAPO Government in Namibia?**

Although not directly related to the United Nations Implementation Plan, there is considerable suspicion that South Africa's reluctance to implement Resolution 435 (1978) fully may be its calculation that SWAPO might win a free and fair election under UN supervision. At one stage in the lengthy negotiations on Namibian independence, President Botha is reported to have asserted that South Africa would never accept SWAPO as the governing party in Namibia.

South African officials believe that a SWAPO-run government in Namibia will confront South Africa with serious political and security difficulties. They fear that SWAPO will offer aid and comfort to anti-*apartheid* groups and allow the territory of Namibia to be used for cross-border raids. Obviously, a SWAPO government in Namibia, which many see as the likely outcome, will not hesitate to support the African campaign against *apartheid*. And no doubt SWAPO will support the anti-*apartheid* forces in South Africa.

Nevertheless, it could be possible to work out arrangements to meet some of the concerns of South Africa. For instance, while still opposing *apartheid*, Namibia could enter into a nonaggression pact with South Africa. An elected Namibian government could also give an undertaking to observe strict nonalignment with the pledge that it would not permit foreign military bases on its territory. In turn, South Africa should undertake to respect the independence of the territory and to refrain from carrying out a policy of destabilization against the territory.

### **Conclusion**

In taking any new initiative with respect to Namibia it may be necessary to give higher priority to bringing about the independence of Namibia. This may be difficult for the black people of South Africa to accept, but it will be necessary to mobilize international support on an issue where there is broad consensus. In the long run, it would be of greater benefit to the people of South Africa if their government could be made to realize that it cannot continue to flout international opinion. The government of South Africa derives great comfort from the fact that the international community is seriously divided on the appropriate means to end *apartheid* in South Africa. It has become so assured of the absence of any meaningful international action against it that it now believes that it is strong enough to challenge the international community as a whole. The time is opportune to disabuse South Africa. Otherwise, the consequence of this "arrogance of power" may prove disastrous for the peace and stability of the whole southern African region.

There is urgent need to do something about Namibia before it is too late. The failure to honor the commitment to press vigorously for the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) has not enhanced the trust of the African states. Their disenchantment on this and other issues has spilled over to the work of the United Nations and may have adversely affected the smooth functioning of the

United Nations system. The international community cannot enjoy stability if it readily accepts or condones situations where a recognized illegality continues. Note \*: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position of the United Nations Secretariat.

## **Civil War and Superpower Confrontation in Angola: The Search for a Way Out**

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More than two decades of anti-colonial insurgency, civil war, and external intervention have rendered Angola a symbol of man's capacity for inhumanity. Since acceding to independence in 1975 amidst the chaos of collapsed Portuguese rule and zero-sum competition for power among three insurgent movements, Angola has been ravaged by ongoing, externally-fueled, and globally-linked conflict within which the United States has come to play a direct role.

The consequences of such "independence" for something over eight million Angolans have been disastrous: reportedly more than 200,000 war dead, <sup>1</sup> tens of thousands of war amputees, half the population displaced - 400,000 as refugees in adjoining countries. <sup>2</sup> Angola's natural wealth lies largely unexploited (iron, coffee), is pillaged (diamonds), or is diverted (petroleum) to pay for the costs of continuing war. Indeed, the costs of stalemated war have become increasingly pressing incentives for the negotiation of an end to a conflict that defies zero-sum efforts to obtain a military solution. What are the possibilities for and obstacles to a negotiated way out that the policy makers in a new American administration will confront?

In recent months, a flurry of diplomatic activity has suggested to some that peaceful resolution of a conflict that has pitted the forces of a nominally Marxist-Leninist state backed by Cuban troops (35,000-40,000) and sophisticated but often inappropriate Soviet weaponry against "anticommunist" insurgents backed by South African air, artillery, and infantry power and U.S. supplied anti-air (Stinger) and anti-tank (TOW) missiles could be near at hand. The parties to the Angolan conflict are accordingly seen as desirous of extricating themselves from a seemingly interminable war:

- The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government eager to reconstruct a national economy and end human suffering;
- The Soviet Union wanting to reduce the Angolan impediment to improved U.S.-Soviet relations as well as the costs of equipping illfated military ventures;
- Cuba reacting to international disapproval and inroads of disease and demoralization among its troops;
- The United States desiring to escape an awkward de facto alliance with South Africa, eliminating the Cuban presence while resolving a regional dispute with the Soviet Union, and preserving an American role within the burgeoning petroleum sector of the Angolan economy;
- Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which has all along sought participation within, not (at least immediately) replacement of the government in Luanda; and
- South Africa responding to modest but politically difficult to tolerate casualties (reportedly 45 mostly white conscripts were lost in recent Angolan action), <sup>3</sup> risks of important losses of irreplaceable warplanes, and diversion of scarce resources from domestic economic and social programs crucial to its own prescriptions for political survival. <sup>4</sup>

Despite evident desires for a way out of a destructive military impasse as symbolized by the protracted siege of Cuito Cuanavale, confounding realities of personal and group enmity, distorted threat perceptions and unrequited ambitions remain stubborn obstacles to Angolan peace. Just how stubborn can be understood by examining recent regional power shifts that underlie and hamper the current quest of American diplomats for a southern African detente. By linking the withdrawal of South African troops from illegally occupied Namibia (as called for by Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)) to a parallel withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and by joining South Africa in a low cost but

effective support of UNITA insurgency that rendered an insecure Angolan government more dependent on those very Cuban forces, United States policy helped to alter political/military realities. Namibian nationalists of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) operating from Angolan sanctuaries were obliged to help the MPLA combat UNITA insurgency and resist South African incursions into Angola, effectively eliminating SWAPO's capacity to challenge South African authority within Namibia. With an assist from Israeli military technology (e.g. electronic devices to thwart Soviet air defense missiles), <sup>5</sup> South African forces acting in tandem with UNITA established control over great swaths of lightly populated south and southeastern Angola.

Thus, when Chester Crocker, United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, recently managed to convince the Angolan government to declare what it had always implicitly accepted, the principle of total Cuban withdrawal, and to agree to a speedier than previously proposed timetable for such withdrawal in return for reciprocal South African withdrawal from Namibia, the South African government pointed to changed realities. In the words of a sympathetic journalist, "the South African army [had] changed the military equation." The most that a Cuban withdrawal could produce at this point might be a South African withdrawal from Angola, not Namibia. <sup>6</sup>

This new "military equation" achieved with American assistance, combined with South African anger over economic sanctions imposed under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, led State President P.W. Botha publicly to belittle American diplomacy and praise the political acumen of Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Following on suggestions by Defense Minister Magnus Malan that South Africa and the Soviet Union directly negotiate the emplacement of a "neutral" government in Angola, President Botha indicated that he doubted that Chester Crocker had contributed to a now perceived willingness on the part of Cuba to withdraw its forces short of a Namibian settlement. "It certainly took a

long time [to get to this point] and there was not real movement until we got involved directly." It was South African military might that mattered. Because of military losses the Soviets and Cubans are "frustrated," Moscow is "shopping" for a "compromise," and South Africa has no intention of leaving Angola "until the Cubans leave." [7](#)

South Africa unlinked what Washington had (for it so helpfully) linked and did so confident that the United States was now politically locked into the support of UNITA insurgency and thus unable to negotiate diplomatic recognition of the Angolan government. Washington was unable either to protect American petroleum firms with Angolan assets from harassment by pro-UNITA lobbyists in the United States or to help the Luanda government pursue reformist economic policies under which it was abandoning earlier Marxist dogmatism and turning to western economic models and collaborators. Reflecting the apparent self-assurance of a government that saw itself as having outmaneuvered and bypassed a punitive but native superpower, President Botha predicted that war-induced starvation and a desperate need for development capital left the MPLA with "no alternative" but to "come to terms" with UNITA. [8](#)

Despite hope that internal preoccupations of *perestroika* and a new realism and reasonableness in Soviet policy might render Moscow increasingly amenable to negotiated diffusion of regional conflicts, South Africa's truculence within a context of diminished American influence constitutes a "high-risk game." Pretoria, its sympathizers acknowledge, could "well end up with a bloody nose." [9](#)

Meanwhile, Washington continues to try to persuade the Soviets to persuade the Angolans and Cubans to offer Cuban withdrawal on terms that would, in turn, persuade South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. Neither military circumstances nor political reality within South Africa, where a surging far right opposition would be quick to denounce a Namibian "sell out," suggest that such terms are feasible.

Moreover, the MPLA government, viewing Jonas Savimbi's legendary ability to mesmerize, maneuver, and mobilize with fear and loathing, holds adamantly to its often declared refusal to negotiate with him (as distinct from lesser figures within UNITA). In the words of Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos, there can be no "reconciliation between the victim and the murderer, no negotiations with Jonas Savimbi." <sup>10</sup> Does this mean that Angola is fated to the inevitability of continuing war? Does it mean that South Africa has veto power over regional detente on anything other than its own terms? Does it mean that notions of an American-Soviet initiative to convene an international conference <sup>11</sup> or to otherwise engage in meaningful discussion of how to reduce conflict in southern Africa are mere fancy? Beneath the bluster and bombast, is there not more willingness to compromise than appears on the surface? Might it be, as Lisbon's *Inform Africa* (March 7, 1988) ventures, that Luanda may be about ready to make major concessions such as ending its support for SWAPO because of a fear that UNITA may create a de facto southern Angolan state? Given the extent of war weariness and destruction, such concessions to South African military power cannot be ruled out, but they seem unlikely.

What seems more likely is that a new American administration will inherit an Angolan policy that has contributed to a general loss of United States influence and an increase in South African capacity to destabilize - but not to mold Angola and the southern Africa region to South African purpose. What policy options will be available to an American administration in these circumstances?

First, it could act to rebuild American influence by restoring the multilateralism that was discarded when the United States broke with the Western Contact Group (Britain, Canada, France, West Germany) and unilaterally linked Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Second, it could explore possibilities for understandings and parallel actions with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing regional tensions, including those associated with the U.S.-

Soviet confrontation-by-proxy in Angola. South Africa might be less obstructive if confronted with the fact of concerted superpower pressure. Indeed, its policies seem calculated to play the two superpowers off against each other, reflecting considerable apprehension about the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. Through the exercise of strong presidential leadership, the United States might be able to persuade both its allies and competitors to make it firmly but quietly clear to South Africa that failure to cooperate in regional peace initiatives would result in increasing economic, technological, and diplomatic isolation and ever more costly military expenditures.

Third, in collaboration with western allies and in dialogue with the Soviet Union, a new American administration might seek to encourage the MPLA government to extend its pragmatic economic reforms to the political realm. The MPLA might be encouraged to open its political system to regional, religious, and ethnic groups previously maltreated or marginalized. Were the MPLA to offer political amnesty, a degree of regional autonomy, full religious and cultural tolerance, and/or proposals for local cease fires and free elections, it might itself reduce, if not eliminate, the grievances that have nourished UNITA insurgency.

Finally, external powers, including the United States, might attempt to move the political focus away from the acceptability or unacceptability of Jonas Savimbi and press instead for a generous redefinition of the policy of National Reconciliation under which the MPLA has previously reconciled with former opposition forces (Bakongo groups) in the north of the country. Firm multilateral pressure in favor of such initiatives, if combined with economic incentives to heighten prospects for a dramatic economic takeoff, might conceivably alter political realities within Angola in a fundamental manner. What might happen if, after implementation of significant political reforms, the MPLA were to offer UNITA participation in regional or even national institutions with the proviso that Jonas Savimbi "volunteer" to step aside?

Within the framework of a broadly accommodating opening of the Angolan political system it should be possible for Cuban forces to withdraw without loss of face, for an international peacekeeping force to move into areas bordering Namibia (South Africa would be unlikely to tangle with it), and for the United States to recognize the Angolan government and help it to reopen the Benguela railroad, thereby freeing Zaire and Zambia from their dependence on South African trade routes.

The United States allowed itself to be trapped into a self-defeating Angolan policy. It will need fully to exploit its capacity for strategic thinking, imaginative diplomacy, and multilateral leadership if it is to break out of this trap. Only then might it contribute to a peaceful solution to the Angolan tragedy. Success might, in fact, be beyond American reach at this stage - realism suggests modest expectations.

Nonetheless, buried under the hatred and violence that fuels the Angolan war lie the bricks of human decency with which to construct a different future. A new American administration must press all concerned to help Angola build a new, more open and prosperous society while simultaneously working to create and present to South Africa a new reality, that of collective political purpose. The Angolan war presents the United States with a defiant challenge. It also presents it with potentially exciting opportunity.

## **United States Policy Toward Mozambique**

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### **A desperate situation exists in Mozambique.**

- The countryside is gripped by war. The war has affected all 10 of Mozambique's provinces. Movement outside of major cities is restricted. Two million Mozambicans have been displaced by the war.
- The economy is in a state of virtual collapse. Per capita GNP has fallen to \$140 a year. Export earnings have plummeted.
- Human suffering has reached nearly unimaginable proportions. Reliable estimates indicate that 4.5 million people have been hurt by the war. In 1983-84 as many as 100,000 people died of starvation.
- The country's survival is now dependent on a massive international support effort. Over 30 non-governmental organizations now operate in Mozambique. Extensive economic and security assistance is provided by an ideologically diverse array of supporters.

### **The sources of Mozambique's troubles are many.**

- Decades of Portuguese rule left a highly dependent, narrowly based, and extremely underdeveloped economy. At independence there were less than a handful of college educated Africans. Basic human services such as hospitals and schools were largely nonexistent in much of the country. Over 90% of the country was illiterate.
- A sudden and bitter transfer of power in 1975 resulting in the abrupt departure of over two hundred thousand Portuguese settlers left the new government headed by President Samora Machel largely unequipped to manage the economy and society.
- A commitment to Marxism-Leninism caused the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the ruling party, to launch an ill-advised attempt to socialize the economy that contributed to economic decline and alienated many peasants. For example, although they received the bulk of the agricultural budget, by 1982 state farms accounted for only 20% of total output and not a single state farm was profitable. Between 1979 and 1981 production on collective fields declined by 50%. By 1982, the state run industrial sector was operating at only 40% of capacity.
- FRELIMO's support for insurgents of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU) in the independence struggle in neighboring Rhodesia caused the Rhodesian government to launch direct military operations against Mozambique and sponsor the creation of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), a band of anti-FRELIMO insurgents. South Africa took over RENAMO when Zimbabwe became independent. RENAMO now has roughly 12,000 troops and operates throughout the country. RENAMO is composed of a disparate collection of disaffected Mozambicans and forced recruits. There is a core group of insurgents led by Afonso Dhlakama, but they are probably not responsible for all of the activity attributed to RENAMO. Some military actions

- have been carried out directly by South African forces, others are the result of free banditry.
- Following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the South African government launched a concerted effort to destabilize Mozambique economically and militarily. This has involved supporting RENAMO, launching direct raids on alleged ANC facilities, cutting rail traffic through Maputo, and reducing the flow of Mozambican workers to the South African mines. But Pretoria has combined pressure with efforts to draw Maputo into its economic sphere. For example, South Africans still play a major role in running Maputo's port and are currently engaged in supporting the port's expansion.
  - In the early 1980s the country's plight was exacerbated by natural disaster, especially drought.

### **Mozambique's policies have changed significantly since 1975.**

- Acknowledging the failures of its socialist economic policies, FRELIMO is now pursuing a balanced strategy that emphasizes market incentives and encourages foreign investment.
- Reliance on Soviet and Eastern bloc assistance has been greatly reduced.
- Extensive efforts have been made to establish close economic and political ties with the West.
- A pragmatic, accommodative posture toward South Africa has been adopted. Support for ANC military activity has stopped.

### **U.S. relations with Mozambique have improved considerably.**

- In the latter years of the Carter era, Maputo and Washington began to develop a closer relationship, largely as a result of their mutual interest in a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia.
- After a brief but intense period of tension in 1981-82, the Reagan administration responded positively and aggressively to signals that Mozambique was interested in a rapprochement.
- This rapprochement was solidified in 1984 when Mozambique, with American encouragement, signed the Nkomati accord with South Africa.
- Despite the failure of the Nkomati accord to end South African support for RENAMO and the limited and highly restricted U.S. aid it has received, Mozambique remains committed to close ties with the United States and the West. In fact, it has no real alternative given Soviet reluctance to significantly increase assistance levels.
- Despite pressure from conservatives, the Reagan administration is unlikely to abandon its policy of supporting FRELIMO. With the other strands of its strategy of constructive engagement in tatters, it can ill afford to abandon its only southern African "success."

**A new American administration will face a set of very difficult choices in Mozambique.**

- The effectiveness of the Reagan administration's current policy is seriously hampered by: (1) indications of some support within the administration for a policy that would pressure FRELIMO to negotiate with RENAMO; and (2) congressional restrictions on aid to Mozambique.
- Support for Mozambique that does not address the security situation is unlikely to be very effective.

**A new administration will have four options.**

1. Continue the current policy of providing political and economic support without security assistance.
2. Provide security assistance either (a) bilaterally or (b) as part of a concerted international initiative.
3. Limit United States assistance to humanitarian aid and politically distance the United States from the situation.
4. Shift United States support to RENAMO.

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**Footnotes**

**Note 1:** *The Economist*, March 12, 1988. [Back.](#)

**Note 2:** See "Logistics Key to Relief in Angola," *Africa Recovery* (United Nations, New York), December 1987. [Back.](#)

**Note 3:** *New York Times*, March 28, 1988. [Back.](#)

**Note 4:** See, for example, the analyses in *The Economist*, March 19, 1988; *L'Express* (Paris), March 28, 1988; and *Christian Science Monitor*, November 3, 1987. [Back.](#)

**Note 5:** *Sunday Telegraph* (London), November 15, 1987. [Back.](#)

**Note 6:** Peter Youngusband in *The Washington Times*, March 17, 1988. [Back.](#)

**Note 7:** Arnaud de Borchgrave's interview with P.W. Botha, *Washington Times*, March 14, 1988. [Back.](#)

**Note 8:** Ibid. [Back.](#)

**Note 9:** Youngusband, *Washington Times*, March 17, 1988. [Back.](#)

**Note 10:** President dos Santos' statement to the Portuguese parliament, September 28, 1987. [Back.](#)

**Note 11:** See Colin Legum, "Southern Africa: Growing Interest in an International Conference to Discuss the Region's Problems," *Third World Reports* (London), February 10, 1988. [Back.](#)